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COMBAT SEARCH AND RESCUE: BUILDING A JOINT CAPABILITY TO MEET THE COMBATANT COMMANDER'S REQUIREMENTS
The United States (US) has always placed a significant value on the human dimension of its military. Service members and civilians are the foundation of all American military capabilities, as physical platforms and command and control systems have little asset value to the nation until manned by trained, educated, and motivated people. Providing an adequate level of force protection -from the strategic to the tactical level -is essential to conserving the human element of combat power, and is a fundamental responsibility for a commander's planning and risk management procedures during peacetime and war. 1 A critical subcomponent of force protection is protecting individuals from capture and imprisonment by a hostile enemy force, as the loss of any service member can significantly impact individual morale and ultimately combat power. Denying adversaries the opportunity to exploit the intelligence and propaganda value of captured personnel can often influence the course of national and international politics, and prevent erosion of a nation's ability to continue with the campaign 2 . The presence of a viable US policy to prevent service members from becoming prisoners of war provides a level of individual morale and trust that results in increased operational performance -and is a policy that the American public demands for the security and well-being of their sons and daughters. To provide this protection, military forces conduct personnel recovery operations to rescue individuals before they become isolated and captured.
This paper will examine the combat search and rescue (CSAR) mission sub-set of personnel recovery from both a Service and joint perspective, and analyze its effectiveness in meeting the combatant commander's operational requirements. It will review the historical significance CSAR has had in past combat operations and the resulting political impacts to campaign strategic objectives. As a framework for analysis, the paper will describe joint doctrine and procedures for CSAR command and control, organization, execution, and special mission equipment and consider how each Service is organized to meet these challenging requirements. It will argue that CSAR is a complex operation that requires multiservice capabilities and dedicated forces. Finally, it will propose that the current approach of unilateral Service CSAR leads to redundancy of effort, creates competition for high priority resources, and limits interoperability of rescue forces within the joint operational environment. I conclude the analysis with recommendations for organizing joint, dedicated CSAR forces for the future.
HISTORY AND SIGNIFICANCE OF CSAR
CSAR became an integral part of military operational capabilities with the advent of largescale air power during World War II, where the US experienced heavy losses in European
Theater bomber and escort aircraft shot down over enemy territory. The Army Air Corps joined efforts with the Royal Air Force in an attempt to organize an air-sea rescue organization -the first demonstration of a US aviation rescue force -but still had little capability to rescue aircrews isolated in enemy territory before capture. 3 This rescue force was reorganized for operations in
Korea, but deployed with few assets and an ill defined mission. In spite of an abundance of problems, they were able to build a capability that conducted hundreds of combat saves and participated in evacuating nearly ten thousand United Nations personnel at the end of the Korean War. 4 During the Viet Nam conflict, the introduction of the helicopter for wide spread use provided for the first time an effective capability to quickly extract downed aircrews before they could be captured. CSAR support is also planned concurrently with ongoing combat operations to ensure adequate protection is available for combatants, and must take into account the capabilities and limitations of adjacent units. When CSAR requirements exceed unit capabilities, the commander forwards these requirements to the RCC for further coordination and action. One variation of rescue mission types is to embed recovery forces as an integral part of combat formations during the conduct of operations. This provides a capability to immediately recover downed aircrews or other distressed individuals before they become isolated or at risk for capture. This variation is commonly used during Army attack helicopter deep operations, where recovery helicopters accompany attack formations across friendly lines and loiter within their protection range in order to extract aircrews as soon as they are downed.
FIGURE 1. CSAR COMMAND AND CONTROL TYPES OF RESCUE FORCES AND MISSIONS

EXECUTION OF JOINT CSAR
As previously stated, joint CSAR is a complex operation that requires the combined assets and efforts of multiple services or organizations. Although joint doctrine states that a single unit operating within itself is the preferred method in conducting rescue missions 22 (due to ease of planning, command, and control), there are rarely times during joint combat operations that the coordination of intelligence and battle space allows such independent operations. In these cases, the formation of a CSAR Task Force is required to fully integrate all the required capabilities to effect recovery. RCC that all joint CSAR Task Force forces would be tasked through mission orders and the air tasking order instead of being redirected from ongoing missions.
JOINT CSAR SPECIAL MISSION EQUIPMENT
There are three critical elements of the CSAR mission that allow rescue forces to conduct operations as depicted in the above mission scenario: gaining access to the objective area;
ensuring survivability of rescue forces; and locating and identifying survivors. Joint forces must have the right tools in the form of special mission equipment in order to quickly find and recover an isolated person before they can be captured.
Access to the objective area is the ability of the rescue force to travel to the survivor's location and return. In order to provide coverage of the entire joint operations area, CSAR forces must be positioned as far forward as possible and able to quickly range hundreds of miles of territory. In many cases CSAR forces must base and operate out of adjoining countries when forward positioning is not possible. This long distance projection requires forces to be rapidly deployable, with equipment that is light and air-deployable on strategic or intra-theater lift assets. Rescue aircraft must also have extended range capabilities, either with auxiliary fuel tanks or aerial refueling equipment, in order to range the required distances.
Survivability of rescue forces is the capability to provide self-protection while in the objective area. Recovery aircraft require advanced missile and radar detectors to defeat enemy air defense systems, and internally mounted weapon systems with increased range and improved stopping power to defeat enemy ground threats. Self-protection is an imminent change to CSAR aircraft as high-speed fighters, such as the F-16 and F-15E, are now being assigned to CSAR protection roles. 27 These fighters operate at altitudes that significantly reduce their ability to suppress enemy close to the vicinity of the objective area, and require CSAR aircraft to move away from the traditional role of being defensively postured to an offensive force capable of collaborative action to fight their way in and out of objective areas.
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Finally, CSAR forces must be able to quickly locate and accurately identify survivors in order to reduce vulnerabilities inherent with search operations. To accomplish this, they rely on an advanced information architecture -combining voice, data, and satellite technologies -to communicate directly with the survivor and other members of the CSAR Task Force. Using advanced automated data links, command and control elements can instantly broadcast mission updates to all participating forces while enroute to the area, significantly reducing the time required for pre-mission planning. Next-generation radios can relay survivor position coordinates via satellite, which in turn broadcast the information as an integrated picture directly to rescue aircraft cockpit multifunctional displays. This information can also be instantly shared with all other joint forces operating in the area, which enhances integration and deconfliction with other on-going conventional missions.
These special mission equipment requirements, however, are a capability that is not readily available in the US military's conventional forces today. They will require all the Services to invest substantial time, effort, and cost in order to standardize and integrate this capability into their existing forces.
ASSESSMENT OF SERVICE CSAR CAPABILITIES
The force capabilities, and that placing all rescue assets under one command could enhance unity of effort and avoid duplication. 30 The Air Force has also initiated significant upgrade programs to their recovery helicopters, including the addition of a .50 caliber machine gun, and the development of CSAR data automation and dissemination equipment that allows rescue crews to receive continuous intelligence updates during the entire mission execution window. 31 With these efforts, the Air Force has developed an efficient and effective capability; however, they do not have sufficient forces to support the entire joint CSAR requirement.
NAVAL FORCES CSAR CAPABILITIES
The Navy's primary focus for recovery operations is overwater search and rescue in support of carrier-launched air strike operations, however, they do maintain a limited CSAR capability to recover downed aircrews over land. The officer in tactical command (normally the carrier battle group commander) establishes a Rescue Coordination Team (RCT) as his RCC equivalent to provide the planning, coordination, and control of all combat recovery operations.
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Each carrier battle group also includes a small dedicated CSAR force within their antisubmarine warfare squadron that maintains trained crews equipped with conventional helicopters that, when supported by Navy fixed-wing RESCORT, are capable of short range rescue in a medium threat environment. Furthermore, the Services are stretched to fully meet their other personnel recovery responsibilities. CSAR is only one mission requirement; they must also conduct peacetime search and rescue, maintain competent RCC manning, provide Survival, Escape, Resistance, and Evasion training to those in high risk of capture, and resource a repatriation capability to return survivors back to their units. Overall, there are insufficient dedicated CSAR assets capable of rapidly responding to combat mission requirements and providing the capability combatant commanders need to meet their operational protection obligations.
BUILDING A JOINT CSAR CAPABILITY
Combatant commanders of joint theaters of operation are responsible for unifying the actions of all the Services to achieve a synergistic application of the military element of national power. 38 They achieve this by synchronizing individual Service forces into more-capable joint forces. Combatant commanders rely on the Services to train and equip forces that are able to rapidly task organize into a joint force, with interoperable equipment and trained personnel that can function in a joint environment. The overall effect is a capabilities-based force that maximizes operational effectiveness and avoids duplication of effort, versus a Service-based force that requires each component to field redundant capabilities in support of itself.
This capabilities philosophy is also applicable to CSAR forces -combatant commanders need Service assets integrated into a joint capability that enhances the overall force. They Consolidating all functions of the CSAR mission area -from lead agency to force provider -under one command is the best option for providing clear direction, streamlining efforts, and enhancing force readiness. SOCOM is the only organization with the necessary force management, command and control, and specially equipped assigned forces to fully meet the combatant commander's requirements -the individual Service approach is too heavily reliant on the Services' abilities to fully comply with the direction set by any lead agency. Special operations forces, however, are already in high demand with limited assets to meet their DoDwide mission. This option will require significant reprogramming of funds, additional fielding of aircraft and equipment, and specialized training in order to build a dedicated and ready CSAR force.
CONCLUSION
The combat search and rescue mission area has suffered from neglect for decades, grudgingly accepted by the Services as a necessary but unwelcome resource-consumer.
Combatant commanders have stated a requirement for joint integrated capabilities and efforts from all Services, commands, staffs, and forces; but the current focus on individual Service programming does not provide the capability to meet theater force protection obligations. This problem will not fix itself; it will only be resolved with a strong DoD emphasis placed on directing the Services to build CSAR capabilities that are both effective and affordable. CSAR will become increasingly important in the future as the US withdraws forward presence forces, relies on joint fires interdependency, and conducts more operations in asymmetrical environments.
The political cost of ignoring this issue much longer may be too high to pay, as failure to field the best possible means to recover isolated persons could significantly undermine future campaigns. As a nation at war, "preserving the life and well-being of our service members and civilians who are placed in harm's way while defending our nation's interests is, and must 24 Joint Pub 3-50.2, II-7 through 9. The elements of a joint CSAR Task Force include: Airborne Mission Commander (AMC) serves as an extension of the executing component commander's RCC by coordinating all efforts from a forward airborne location. AMC responsibility is typically delegated to the JFACC's command and control platform (AWACs or JSTARs) controlling for the battle space over the isolated person. The AMC provides longrange communications to all CSAR Task Force members, manages the flow of aircraft in the area, coordinates airspace and fires, and advises the JSRC and RCC of mission progress. Onscene Commander (OSC) is the individual designated by the AMC to coordinate all rescue efforts at the rescue site. Recovery helicopters are multiple aircraft that are required to fly to the objective area and execute the recovery. An additional requirement is a ground force on board the helicopters to dismount, authenticate, and assist the survivor. Rescue Escort (RESCORT) are tactical aircraft capable of operating close to the altitude, speed, and endurance of the recovery helicopters to provide protection from surface threats. RESCORT forces are normally designated as OSC. Rescue Combat Air Patrol (RESCAP) is counterair and electronic warfare aircraft assigned to protect rescue forces form airborne and surface threats. They also provide protection for the isolated person until other CSAR Task Force elements arrive in the objective area. Support aircraft are refueling tankers, command and control platforms, or other forces necessary to support operations. 25 RESCORT is not always provided by armed helicopters. The Air Force also maintains jet aircraft (typically A-10s known as "SANDY") specifically trained and qualified to provide protection enroute and over the objective area. 29 Air Force Doctrine Document 2-1.6, 12. 30 Herbert.
